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Constructing the context through
goals and schemata: top-down
processes in comprehension
and beyond
Marco Mazzone*
Department of Humanities, University of Catania, Catania, Italy
My main purpose here is to provide an account of context selection in utterance
understanding in terms of the role played by schemata and goals in top-down processing.
The general idea is that information is organized hierarchically, with items iteratively
organized in chunks—here called “schemata”—at multiple levels, so that the activation of
any items spreads to schemata that are the most accessible due to previous experience.
The activation of a schema, in turn, activates its other components, so as to predict a
likely context for the original item. Since each input activates its own schemata, conflicting
schemata compete with (and inhibit) each other, while multiple activations of a schema
raise its likelihood to win the competition. There is therefore a double movement—with
bottom-up activation of schemata enabling top-down prediction of other contextual
components—triggered by multiple sources. Another claim of the paper is that goals
are represented by schemata placed at the highest-levels of the executive hierarchy, in
accordance with Fuster’s model of the brain as a hierarchically organized perception-
action cycle. This account can be considered, in part at least, a development of ideas
contained in Relevance Theory, though it may imply that some other claims of the theory
are in need of revision. Therefore, a secondary purpose of the paper is a contribution to
the analysis of that theory.
Keywords: schemas, context, mindreading, hierarchical representation, pragmatics
Introduction
The problem of adequately accounting for the cognitive role of context does not affect only prag-
matics: most, and possibly all, human behaviors require taking into account indefinitely changeable
contexts and even decidingwhat counts as the relevant context in the present case. As amatter of fact,
one of the most developed theories in cognitive pragmatics is Relevance Theory (from now on, RT;
Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995), in which communication is analyzed as a special case of cognition
precisely because both cognition in general and communication in particular have the problem of
selecting what is relevant in the present context (or which is the presently relevant context).
My main purpose here is to provide an account of context selection in utterance understanding
in terms of the role played by schemata and goals in top-down processing. This account can be
considered, in part at least, a development of ideas contained in RT, though it may imply that some
other claims of the theory are in need of revision. Therefore, a secondary purpose of the paper is a
contribution to the analysis of RT. On the other hand, I also aim to show that the proposed account,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 6511
Mazzone Constructing the context through goals and schemata
which is based on a quite general mechanism, is consistent with
explanations of flexible behavior in linguistics, in theory of con-
cepts, and in psychological, neuroscientific, and computational
theories of action control.
Relevance Theory has conceived of utterance interpretation as
a special case of the search for relevance in cognition. Utterances
raise expectations of relevance in the addressees, thus triggering
a search for contexts in which they are actually made relevant.
In practice, non-demonstrative inferences are constructed, with
encoded meaning and contextual assumptions acting as premises
that license contextual conclusions.1 Utterance interpretation thus
amounts to identifying the relevant cognitive context, that is,
the appropriate and intended set of contextual assumptions (and
conclusions). In this account, an important role is played by the
organization of memory, more precisely by the differential acces-
sibility of contents: these can be more or less strongly associated
to (and then more or less easily activated by) the inputs to be
processed. Relevance theorists have occasionally noted that such
differential accessibility may depend on the fact that memory
is organized in chunks, a point that notions such as schemata,
frames, scripts etc. are intended to account for.
In this paper, I take this idea very seriously and attempt to
frame it within a general model of the human brain architecture
and cognitive processing. This model, proposed by Fuster (2001,
2003, 2014), conceives our cortex as organized along two highly
interconnected hierarchies of representations, the sensory and the
motor one, which together constitute a perception-action cycle.
The representations are hierarchically organized in the sense that
higher cortical layers provide the structure bywhich items at lower
levels are arranged together, which is a different way to say that
items are iteratively organized in chunks at multiple levels. I will
call “schemata” the higher-level representations describing the
organization of items at lower levels.
The general idea I will pursue is the following.2 The activation
of items at each level gives access in a probabilistic manner to
1Strictly speaking, the inference is from the explicit meaning to the intended
conclusions, with explicit meaning being the result of pragmatic processes
applied to coded meaning. However, for the sake of simplicity I will speak of
coded meaning whenever the distinction is of no import to our discussion.
2Let me introduce explicit definitions of the most important terms I will use. I
call “schema” any higher-level cognitive representation, which is apt to specify
the relationships between its components at a lower level. Schemata are based
on co-occurrences in previous experience and they provide memory with
structure. In the present context, I mainly use “bottom-up activation” to refer
to the process by which pieces of information activate the schemata they per-
tain to, while “top-down activation” is the process by which the activation of a
schema activates in turn its (other) components (for a different sense of “top-
down,” see below The Architecture of the Brain and the Prefrontal Cortex).
“Competition” among representations, and specifically among schemata, may
occur for the simple fact that they are differentially activated and, therefore,
one has stronger effects than the other. However, strictly speaking, activation
is just one side of the coin: there can be both excitatory and inhibitory links
between representations. As a consequence, competition can also occur by
way of inhibition, when schemata represent alternative state of affairs. For an
example, see below (example 1) the discussion of how the ambiguity between
two meanings of “bank” is resolved thanks to the activation of a schema
for GETTING MONEY FROM THE BANK1. Although I will emphasise the
excitatory role of this schema on the contextually appropriate meaning, it
should also be considered the possibility of an inhibitory link between this
meaning and its alternative(s).
schemata they pertain to, that is, activation spreads to schemata
that are the most accessible due to previous experience. The
activation of a schema, in turn, activates its other components,
so as to predict a likely context for the original item. However,
such prediction can be either confirmed or refuted by the actual
context—more precisely, by the variety of the current inputs each
of which activates its own schemata, and therefore its own pre-
dictions about context. Conflicting schemata compete with (and
inhibit) each other, while multiple activations of a schema raise
its likelihood to win the competition. There is therefore a double
movement—with bottom-up activation of schemata enabling top-
down prediction of other contextual components—triggered by
multiple sources.
In utterance understanding, this picture applies both to lin-
guistic and non-linguistic inputs. Each of them spreads activation
to schemata, thus providing probabilistic predictions about their
possible context. Since each input acts as context for the others,
those predictions are in fact assessed against each other.
Another crucial assumption of this paper is that goals are
represented by schemata placed at the highest-levels of the exec-
utive hierarchy, that is, at the top of the motor stream of the
perception-action cycle described by Fuster. In particular, the
most abstract goals are located within the prefrontal cortex (PFC),
which is responsible for controlled action, that is, for top-down
control of action in a processual sense. I will shortly examine how
these different senses of “top-down” are related with each other
and actually involved in utterance understanding: not only do
linguistic and non-linguistic inputs activate schemata in general,
they also activate schemata specifically representing goals, and
this activation may result in attentive (PFC-driven) processing of
utterances.
In line with Grice, but also with suggestions coming from
Levinson and from RT, I will propose in fact that utterance inter-
pretation requires forming hypotheses about goals/intentions. On
the one hand, utterances are evidence provided by the speaker
to the addressee in order for her to recognize a communicative
intention that may go far beyond coded meaning. On the other
hand, recognition of this intention requires its being placedwithin
an entire system of goals, since communicative intentions are in
general means for other goals, which can or cannot be themselves
communicative. In a sense, then, the purpose of communication
is the shared representation of a set of (communicative and non-
communicative) goals by the speaker and the addressee.
In this perspective, language production and understanding
appear to be just components of a more general top-down/
bottom-up cortical dynamic involved in the execution and under-
standing of intentional action. However, such action-oriented
view of language is not uncontroversial, and I will discuss some
theses of RT that might turn out to be in conflict with it.
My discussion of RT requires an important qualification. What
I propose here, apart from being a development of ideas put forth
by RT, can be interpreted in part as an attempt to specify how
RT might be implemented at the neuro-computational level. In
practice, my account of the associative dynamic by which inputs
activate a variety of schemata that compete with, or strengthen
the activation of, each other, may provide a unitary explanation of
the neuromechanics of a range of phenomena spanning different
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levels of linguistic processing. To this extent, I see my proposal
as largely compatible with RT.3 The only problem I raise here
concerns a quite specific issue, that is, the role assigned to quan-
titative expectations of relevance. More specifically, I discuss the
idea that in pragmatic interpretation there is an assessment of the
amount of cognitive effects. As an alternative, I will consider a
different route that has been explored by RT, based on the idea
of expectations about specific types of cognitive effects. As I will
argue, while the idea of a quantitative assessment of cognitive
effects is consistent with the view of communication as geared
to maximization of information, the alternative proposal is more
compatible with the view of communication as based on the
variety of human purposes.
RT and Pragmatic Context
Context and Relevance
First of all, let us consider in some detail the crucial role that
RT assigns to context, to the point that constructing the right
context comes to be seen as the main part of the entire process of
utterance interpretation. Some terminological clarifications are in
order. What RT is in fact concerned with is the cognitive context,
that is, the set of assumptions needed in order for the addressee
to infer the intended conclusions from the coded meaning of
utterances.4 This notion has then to be distinguished from the
more standard notion of linguistic and situational context, that is,
the factual linguistic and extra-linguistic environment in which
the utterance is embedded and which provides further inputs
to cognitive processes. Those inputs contribute to activate the
assumptions involved in the interpretation of codedmeaning: that
is, the factual context contributes to the activation of the cognitive
context.
In this perspective, the context is not something given before
the interpretation starts, contrary to what has often been assumed:
In much of the pragmatic literature, events are assumed to
take place in the following order: first the context is deter-
mined, then the interpretation process takes place, then
relevance is assessed. [: : :RT] suggests a complete reversal
of the order of events in comprehension. It is not that first
the context is determined, and then relevance is assessed.
On the contrary, people hope that the assumption being
processed is relevant (or else they would not bother to
process it at all), and they try to select a context which will
justify that hope: a context which will maximize relevance
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995, p 141–142).
Thus, the interpretation process is not preceded by the selection
of a context, rather the latter is constitutive of the former, and this
process in turn does not precede relevance assessment, on the con-
trary it is driven from the beginning by expectations of relevance.
3With the further qualification that my proposal has consequences whose
compatibility with other aspects of RT requires discussion: for a first example,
RT seems to be committed to the view that the inferential component of
comprehension cannot be implemented in associative terms (for a discussion,
seeMazzone, 2014a); for a second example, my proposal seems to trivialize the
notion of modularity (Mazzone, submitted) in a way that might not fit with
relevance theorists’ views.
4But see note 1.
Such expectations are embodied, so to speak, in the mechanism
by which interpretation is performed, insofar as this mechanism
works so as to ensure that a relevant context is selected. In this
sense, RT claims that cognition in general, and utterance inter-
pretation as a special case, is geared to maximization of relevance.
What then is relevance, and by which mechanism is it attained
in utterance understanding? According to RT, intuitively an input
is relevant when its processing yields a positive cognitive effect,
specifically it “is relevant to an individual when it connects with
background information he has available to yield conclusions that
matter to him” (Wilson and Sperber, 2002a, p. 251). However,
in a realistic account cognitive effects must be balanced against
the cognitive effort required in order to get them. Therefore, a
complete definition of relevance has two sides, a positive and a
negative one:
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cogni-
tive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater
the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing
effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to
the individual at that time (Wilson and Sperber, 2002a,
p. 252–253).
When utterance interpretation is at issue, this definition is
intended to refer to relevance of interpretations (vs. inputs). The
mechanism by which interpretations that are relevant in this
sense are construed is described as a heuristic in two steps, the
“relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure”:
a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive
effects: Test interpretive hypotheses [: : :] in order of
accessibility.
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied
(Wilson and Sperber, 2002a, p. 260).
The first step of the comprehension procedure is easily under-
stood in the following terms. An interpretation is built following
a path of least effort, that is, contextual assumptions licensing
contextual conclusions (in relation to the coded meaning) are
selected in order of accessibility. This step does not require more
than a simple associative mechanism, whichmakes some assump-
tions more accessible than others given the utterance and the
factual context. As to the second step, it prescribes some sort of
assessment of the obtained interpretation against previous expec-
tations of relevance. However, I see here a potential problem,
which has consequences for the proposed definition of relevance
as well. RT has provided only vague suggestions about how this
assessment might be performed, as Sperber and Wilson (1987,
p. 742) themselves admit:
Relevance, as it affects cognition, is not computed or
numerically measured but monitored or assessed, yielding
only gross absolute judgments and, in certain types of cases
only, finer relative judgments. Suppose that the brain is
sensitive to the amount of reorganization brought about by
the processing of some information and to the expenditure
of energy thus incurred, just as it is sensitive to changes
of posture and expenditure of energy in the case of bodily
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movement. This is very vague—hopelessly so, some AI
[artificial intelligence] people may think—but it is not so
vague that it could not be false, and it is whatwe are claiming
anyhow.
Starting from Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, p. 130), rele-
vance theorists have occasionally repeated without further devel-
opment such “speculation,” as they call it, according to which
“contextual effects and mental effort, just like bodily movements
and muscular effort, must cause some symptomatic physico-
chemical changes.” To my knowledge, none of the supporters of
RT has ever tried to relate this speculation to any known cognitive
mechanism. However, I want to show that RT has provided a
number of clues pointing toward a different direction.
To start with, it should be noted that, while this speculation
concerns the assessment of both effects and effort, there is in
fact an asymmetry between them in the comprehension proce-
dure. The minimization of effort is apparently ensured already
by the first step, that is, by accessing the most accessible (i.e.,
the least costly) interpretations in the first place. This may sug-
gest that what needs to be further assessed, as required by the
second step, is (the maximization of) cognitive effects. As a
matter of fact, relevance theorists often refer to expectations of
relevance specifically in terms of expectations about the amount
of cognitive effects. In sum, while the criterion of effort can be
accounted for very naturally in terms of associative accessibility,
it is the criterion of cognitive effects that needs to make an appeal
to the above speculation about “symptomatic physico-chemical
changes.”
However, RT has also considered two alternative views about
expectations of cognitive effects, even if only implicitly.
Does Effort do Everything?
According to the first suggestion, the criterion of minimization
of effort alone might be sufficient to drive the cognitive system
toward the maximization of benefits. This is suggested in passing
by Sperber and Wilson (1996), in a passage where effort is first
considered, as one would expect, as the purely negative side of
relevance, but then an unexpected question follows (emphasized
in italics):
when expectations of effect are wholly indeterminate, the
mind should base itself on considerations of effort: pick up
from the environment the most easily attended stimulus,
and process it in the context of what comes most readily to
mind. Ceteris paribus, what is easier is more relevant, if it is
relevant at all.Butwhat are the chances that what comesmore
easily to mind is, in fact, relevant? [emphasis mine] They
would be close to nil, if saliency in the environment and
accessibility in memory were both random, and moreover
uncorrelated (Sperber and Wilson, 1996).
The question is unexpected, because there seems to be no
reason why “what comes more easily to mind” should be relevant
over and beyond the fact that it is, ceteris paribus, relevant by
definition simply because it demands little effort (negative side of
relevance). Of course, easily accessed stimuli (and interpretations)
might happen to be almost entirely irrelevant on the positive side,
that is, they might have little or no cognitive effects. But it is
precisely in order to avoid that risk that the second step of the
comprehension procedure is required, while here Sperber and
Wilson seem to wonder whether ease of access can by itself ensure
some relevance on the positive side. And in fact the previous
quotation is followed by an evolutionary argument to the effect
that what requires little cognitive effort is also likely to be, so
to speak, the right sort of information, independently of any
further mechanism for ensuring that sufficient cognitive effects
are attained:
But humans are evolved organisms with learning capacities
of sorts, so it is not too surprising to find that they sponta-
neously pay more attention [: : :] to objects and events that,
on average, are more likely to be relevant to them.
For the same reason, it is not surprising that the perceptual
categorization of a distal stimulus should tend to activate
related information in memory. [: : :] Nor is it surprising
that memory is so organized that pieces of information
that are likely to be simultaneously relevant tend to be co-
accessed or co-activated in chunks variously described in
the literature as “concepts” “schemas,” “scripts,” “dossiers,”
etc (Sperber and Wilson, 1996).
In practice, the suggestion is made that relevance on the neg-
ative side of the notion (the ease-of-access side) is sufficient to
ensure relevance also on the positive side. More specifically, the
organization of information in memory, by means of concepts,
schemas etc., is suggested to ensure that ease of access of a
given content is a reliable sign of its (probabilistic) contextual
significance.
I want to emphasize that this suggestion is very close to a
proposal made by Recanati (2004) with regard to what he calls
“primary pragmatic processes.” These are processes by which
the coded meaning of utterances is adjusted and expanded in
order to get the contextually appropriate and complete proposi-
tion that is today called the “explicit meaning” of the utterance.
In Recanati’s view, these processes, unlike the genuinely infer-
ential ones required for deriving the implicit meaning of the
utterance from its explicit meaning, are simple associative pro-
cesses based on spreading of activation in conceptual networks.
According to Recanati, this spreading activation is not wholly
unconstrained and blind insofar as it activates schemata5, which
ensure a search for coherent interpretations: “Coherent, schema-
instantiating interpretations [: : :] tend to be selected and preferred
over non-integrated or “loose” interpretations” (Recanati, 2004,
p. 37). This occurs because of a double associative dynamic: on
the one hand, on the bottom-up direction of the dynamic, “a
schema is activated by, or accessed through, an expression whose
semantic value corresponds to an aspect of the schema”; on the
other hand, on the top-down direction, the “schema thus activated
in turn raises the accessibility of whatever possible semantic values
5Recanati prefers the plural “schemata” whereas Sperber and Wilson use
“schemas.” From now on, I will always use the former for the sake of unifor-
mity. For a more extensive discussion of the notion of schema, see Mazzone
(2014a).
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for other constituents of the sentence happen to fit the schema”
(Recanati, 2004, p. 37).6
Interestingly, not only have Sperber and Wilson (1996) sug-
gested a similar role for schemata (scripts etc.) in the context of the
theoretical discussion mentioned above; relevance theorists have
also appealed to this mechanism in various analyses of concrete
examples. For instance, let us consider Carston’s (2007) analysis
of the following utterance:
(1) I’m going to the bank now to get some cash.
Since there are two possible meanings for “bank” (FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTION, RIVER SIDE), the problem is how the
addressee may come to choose the right one. Carston (2007)
makes the hypothesis that starting from the activation of CASH,
a stereotypical frame or script for GETTING MONEY FROM
A BANK1 (where BANK1 = FINANCIAL INSTITUTION) is
recalled, thus strengthening the activation of BANK1. As in Reca-
nati (2004), the idea is that something like a schema is activated
bottom-up by some of its component (GETTINGMONEYFROM
A BANK1 is activated by the concept GETTING MONEY, which
is activated in turn from the words “to get some cash”), and
then it raises top-down the accessibility of its other components
(BANK1 = FINANCIAL INSTITUTION), so that the concept
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION comes to be preferred as the inter-
pretation of “bank.”
In this example, the relevant meaning of “bank” can be selected
by nothing else than ease of access, thanks to the fact that—in
Sperber andWilson’s (1996) words—“memory is so organized that
pieces of information that are likely to be simultaneously relevant
tend to be co-accessed or co-activated in chunks.”7
Expectations about Either the Amount
or the Type of Effects?
If our previous considerations are right, it might be the case
that, contrary to the standard view in RT, no assessment of
cognitive effects is required in addition to the negative criterion
of accessibility. However, in many occasions relevance theorists
have claimed instead that simple accessibility does not constrain
interpretations enough, and that some independent assessment of
6Mazzone (2011a, 2014a) argues for a generalization of this explanation
(based on associative processing and schemata) beyond the limits of “primary
pragmatic processes.”
7As correctly pointed out by one of the referees, relevance theorists have
developed a view of lexical pragmatics (with an important role for the notion of
ad hoc concepts) that is not mainly based on ease of access. This view is in fact
consistent with their general assumption that, although associative links may
affect the accessibility of contextual assumptions and conclusions, the overall
interpretation will only be accepted “if it satisfies the hearer’s expectations of
relevance and is properly warranted by the inferential comprehension heuris-
tic” Wilson and Carston (2006, p. 429). I have discussed these proposals in
more details elsewhere (for RT’s lexical pragmatics, seeMazzone, 2011a, 2014c;
for ad hoc concepts, Mazzone, 2014a). My only point here is that, insofar as
RT’s lexical pragmatics ultimately depends on the inferential comprehension
heuristic and expectations of relevance, it is crucial to understand how those
expectations are assessed. In section context and relevance I raised a problem
for the standard RT’s proposal based on the quantitative notion of expectations
of relevance, while in the next section I argue that that problem can be avoided
by adopting a different, qualitative, notion.
cognitive benefits is needed. Specifically, the standard view is that
interpretations must be assessed against some expected amount
of cognitive effects. But relevance theorists have also explored a
different route, that is, the idea that our expectations of relevance
concern the type rather than the amount of cognitive benefits.
I intend to argue, first, that there is a substantial difference in
conceiving expectations of relevance in terms of the type vs.
the amount of cognitive effects, and, second, that, at a closer
analysis, this hypothesis points to the same direction as the sug-
gestion that cognitive efforts may suffice to explain the search for
relevance.
First of all, let us note that relevance theorists explicitlymention
expectations about the type of cognitive effects, either with or
without mention of their amount. For an example of the men-
tion of both, consider this quotation from Carston (2007, p. 20,
emphasismine): “an utterance automatically triggers quite specific
expectations of relevance in its addressee, that is, expectations
concerning both the quantity and the kind of cognitive effects
(implications) it will yield if optimally processed.” Mention of
the type has become especially frequent in recent versions of
RT, the ones characterized—in Wilson’s (2004, p. 352) words—by
“the introduction of the mutual adjustment process (e.g., Sperber
and Wilson, 1998; Wilson and Sperber, 2002b, 2004).” The idea
is that pragmatic processing does not operate sequentially, by
means of only forward inferences from the proposition expressed
to the intended cognitive effects (passing through the selection of
appropriate contextual assumptions). On the contrary, there is a
parallel process based on both forward and backward inferences,
in the course of which explicit content, contextual assumptions
and cognitive effects are mutually adjusted to each other:
Mutual adjustment is seen as taking place in parallel rather
than in sequence. The hearer does not first identify the
proposition expressed, then access an appropriate set of
contextual assumptions and then derive a set of cognitive
effects. In many cases [: : :], he is just as likely to reason
backward from an expected cognitive effect to the context
and content that would warrant it (Wilson, 2004, p. 353;
emphasis mine).
As the last sentence suggests, the backward inferences involved
in the mutual adjustment process require expectations about spe-
cific kinds of cognitive effects. For one example (fromWilson and
Carston, 2007), consider the following exchange:
(2) Peter: Will Sally look after the children if we get ill?
Mary: Sally is an angel.
Apparently the implicit content conveyed by Mary’s utterance
is an affirmative answer to the question raised by Peter, something
like SALLY WILL LOOK AFTER THE CHILDREN IF WE GET
ILL. This can be seen as the conclusion of an inference having as
its premises the explicit content of Mary’s utterance and possibly
some contextual assumptions. As to the explicit content, however,
the concept that the word “angel” contributes to it cannot be the
encoded conceptANGELwhich has as its property SUPERNATU-
RAL BEINGOFACERTAINKIND. It must be instead a different
concept obtained by adjusting the encoded concept to the context.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 6515
Mazzone Constructing the context through goals and schemata
A natural explanation of this adjustment is precisely by means of
a backward inference from the expected conclusion. Since Peter’s
question requires a yes/no answer, it can be thought to raise the
expectation thatMary intends to claim either SALLYWILLLOOK
AFTER THE CHILDREN IF WE GET ILL or its negation, and
this expectation in turn licenses a backward inference toward
the explicit content, which has to be coherent with either the
affirmative or the negative claim. Thus, the concept ANGEL has
to be adjusted until the explicit content provides a premise (for
instance, SALLY IS KIND AND CARING) which has either the
affirmative or the negative claim as its conclusion.
The example clearly shows how expectations about specific
cognitive effects are involved in drawing backward inferences.
This makes the notion of expected type (of cognitive effects)
significantly different from the one of expected amount: while
the former concerns specific contents that imposes backward
constraints on the content of the premises, the latter is devoid
of any content and therefore can at most permit a comparison
with the amount of actual cognitive effects. Another key differ-
ence is that the notion of backward inferences from expected
cognitive effects admits of a natural explanation in terms of ease
of access via schemata. In our previous example, the expected
cognitive effect that Mary intends to give a yes/no answer to Peter
depends on a well-learned schema connecting yes/no questions
and yes/no answers. Peter’s question is likely to activate this
schema, which in turn activates the expectation about Mary’s
possible answer. On the contrary, with regard to the assessment of
the amount of cognitive effects, RT provides no better explanation
than the vague speculation about “symptomatic physico-chemical
changes.”
To summarize, we have described two alternatives to the stan-
dard RT’s claim that actual cognitive effects are assessed against
expectations about their amount. Now it turns out that these
alternatives are not only complementary but also explainable in
terms of the same mechanism: ease of associative access and
the schematic organization of memory (i.e., the organization of
memory in “chunks”). In fact, expectations about specific kinds
of cognitive effects apparently amount to associative activations
of contextual conclusions via schemata. Thanks to this com-
mon mechanism, contextual assumptions and conclusions can be
activated both by words constituting the utterance (via forward
inferences) and by inputs from the linguistic and non-linguistic
context (via backward inferences). In this perspective, instead of
an assessment of the amount of cognitive effects against expec-
tations of relevance, the process may be described as a mutual
assessment of different predictions about the context. In other
words, the suggestion is that hypotheses about the cognitive con-
text are activated from different sources (utterance, linguistic and
extra-linguistic context) and then assessed against each other, in
a way that appeals only to ease of access (the negative side of
relevance) and the organization of memory: hypotheses that are
coherent with each other within the schematic organization of
memory are activated more strongly and win the competition.
Let me shortly specify what this reconstruction amounts to,
with regard to RT as a whole. Themechanism I have been describ-
ing—based on bottom-up activation of schemata, top-down acti-
vation of contextual information, and an assessment of these
hypotheses on context against each other—is not intended to be
an entirely alternative view of utterance interpretation. As I said,
there are components of RT that I am explicitly endorsing, and
others for which my proposal can be seen as an implementation
from a neuro-computational perspective. In particular, I do not
need to discuss the central core of the theory, that is, its rational
reconstructions of the inferential structure leading from explicit
meaning and a number of contextual assumptions to contextual
implications. My proposal can rather be seen as a contribution to
the understanding of such inferential mechanism, specifically, of
how it is implemented by the basic activation/inhibition dynamic
of the brain. My suggestion is that schemata at different levels
of abstraction provide memory with the rational structure that
is needed not only to activate explicit meaning and contextual
assumptions (and implications), but also to assess which of these
components of pragmatic inferences are coherent with each other
and which are not.8
How Goals Enter into the Picture
Now, I intend to argue that the above picture is entirely compatible
with consideration of goals in utterance interpretation, in the line
suggested by Paul Grice. Grice (1989) has described utterance
understanding as a rational enterprise. More precisely, in his view
the hearer assumes that the speaker is a rational agent pursuing
her communicative goals and producing utterances that can be
inferentially interpreted by the hearer as means to express those
communicative intentions. Thus, in a sense utterance understand-
ing is a matter of reconstructing coherent means-end structures.
In this perspective, Grice also makes an appeal to context as a
way to make guesses about the speaker’s goals, so as to license
inferences backward to (what now is called) the explicit content
of the utterance, as in the following example:
in cases where there is doubt, say, about which of two or
more things an utterer intends to convey, we tend to refer to
the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask
which of the alternatives would be relevant to other things
he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular
situation would fit in with some purpose he obviously has
(e.g., a man who calls for a “pump” at a fire would not want
a bicycle pump; Grice, 1957, p. 387).
In this example, since the context suggests the non-
communicative goal of extinguishing a fire, the interpretation of
a request for “a pump” is adjusted accordingly. A first thing to be
stressed is the structural similarity with our previous example (2),
where Peter’s question can be said to play the same role played
here by extra-linguistic context: it settles the goal thanks to which
the explicit meaning of Mary’s answer is adjusted (via a backward
inference). That is, based on our knowledge of language we
expect that Mary will adopt the goal of answering affirmatively
or negatively Peter’s question. Assuming she has that goal, Mary
can be expected to provide an explicit content which is a proper
means to pursue it.
But not only is there a structural similarity which allows
us to describe both RT’s and Grice’s examples in terms of the
8For a wider discussion of this idea, see Mazzone (2014a).
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retrodiction of means from contextually inferred goals. Moreover,
with regard to Grice’s example, it is natural to think that the
man who calls for a “pump” has literally—not just as a figure of
speech—the goal of extinguishing a fire. Having goals/intentions
is legitimately considered constitutive of the notion of (inten-
tional) action. If that is correct, in Grice’s example the representa-
tion of an extra-linguistic goal is key to the pragmatic interpreta-
tion of theman’s request. To the extent that this can be generalized,
it seems that pragmatic processing needs to be embedded within a
more general ability of mind-reading. This is explicitly recognized
by Sperber andWilson (2002), whomention approvingly Grice for
having described human communication as a case of expression
and recognition of intentions, define pragmatic interpretation
as “an exercise in mind-reading” (Sperber and Wilson, 2002,
p. 3), and propose in fact that the relevance-guided comprehen-
sion procedure is a “sub-module of the human mind-reading
ability” (idem: 21). Although Sperber and Wilson do not draw
such a conclusion, it seems reasonable to conclude that commu-
nicative intentions are embedded within wider goal structures
and that this has a role to play in linguistic production and
comprehension.9
Levinson (1992) has interestingly developed this idea in terms
of the notion of “activity type.” Activity types are defined as social
patterns of goal-directed behaviors in specific settings, delivering
as such expectations about what’s going on next. Specifically,
activity types raise expectations about the communicative actions
to come. This means that communicative actions tend to be
interpreted as moves in the current activity type, and therefore as
something whose goals are expected to be sub-goals of the gen-
eral activity. Levinson gives the following example: the sentence
“C’mon Peter” may have a variety of meanings, but if one hears
it during a basketball game it acquires a very clear sense, based
on the kind of goal the speaker may have in that precise context.
Other examples of activity types are trials and lessons, analyzed
by Levinson in order to show that questions in English may have
very specific uses (i.e., goals), which “are closely tied—indeed,
derived from—the overall goals of the activities in which they
occur” (idem: 82).
Let me summarize. Up to this point I have explored, mostly
through an analysis of RT, the idea that utterance understanding
is accomplished by a mechanism based on ease of access and the
structure of memory. The key idea is that schemata inmemory are
activated (bottom-up) by multiple sources and then compete with
each other for the (top-down) construction of cognitive contexts.
I have also proposed that this process involves representation of
goals.
In the rest of the paper, my purpose is to make this proposal
both clearer and wider in scope by showing that a mechanism of
the same sort has been invoked in a number of different cognitive
domains.
9This proposal is further analysed in Mazzone (in press). One of the referees
observes that RT has developed a complex account of the role of mindreading,
metarepresentations and the mechanism of epistemic vigilance in utterance
understanding. Although there is no room to address here in any detail the
issue, my viewmight be intended as a proposal about the low-level implemen-
tation of mindreading (an associative account of mindreading is defended in
Mazzone, 2014d).
Schemata and Top-down Processes
in the Cortex
Concepts
As noted by relevance theorists, theories of memory assume
that concepts are not isolated entities; they are organized instead
in networks where some connections are stronger than others.
Specifically, concepts are organized in chunks as a consequence
of regular covariations, so as to ensure probabilistic coherence
between them. For one example, Barsalou (2005) has argued for
the notion of situated conceptualization, that is, the idea that con-
ceptual representations in memory preserve information about
specific settings in which the represented objects appear. On this
background, Barsalou provides a nice formulation of the dynamic
of activation between concepts and the situated conceptualiza-
tions they are embedded in:
The situated conceptualization that becomes active con-
stitutes a rich source of inference. The conceptualization
is essentially a pattern, namely, a complex configuration
of multimodal components that represent the situation.
When a component of this pattern matched the situation,
the larger pattern became active in memory. The remain-
ing pattern components-not yet observed-constitute infer-
ences, that is, educated guesses about what might occur
next. Because the remaining components co-occurred fre-
quently with the perceived components in previous sit-
uations, inferring the remaining components is justified
(Barsalou, 2005, p. 628).
It is easy to see that “patterns” are assigned here the same
role played by schemata in our previous explanation of utterance
understanding: a pattern or schema receives activation from any
of its components and, once activated, it raises in turn the accessi-
bility of its other components. Importantly, Barsalou’s analysis is
not concerned with utterance understanding, it is devoted instead
to explain the general functioning of concepts, specifically with
regard to helping construct perception, predicting entities and
events, supporting categorization, and providing inferences in
general (idem: 621). Thus, it seems that our above explanation
of utterance understanding is just a special case of a cognitive
mechanism with a much wider scope.
Language
As a matter of fact, a very similar mechanism is invoked by
Ray Jackendoff (2007a) in his proposal of a parallel architecture
in language processing. The main idea is that the generative
engine at work in language production and comprehension is not
exclusively based on syntax. On the contrary, syntax is just one
of the layers involved—thanks to their respective principles of
organization—in the generative arrangement of linguistic mate-
rials. Crucially, Jackendoff abandons the assumption of a radical
distinction between grammar and lexicon, which was based on
the idea that while lexicon is constituted by representations, syn-
tactic rules are implemented instead by specific processes, with the
former being inert entities processed by the latter. His alternative
proposal is that linguistic entities at any layer, including syntactic
structures, are bits of information stored in long-term memory
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and organized hierarchically, with higher levels prescribing the
way in which items at lower levels must be arranged together. For
each layer (syntax, semantics, phonology), the very same process
of “unification” is held to be responsible for assembling specific
items in accordance with the respective hierarchical organiza-
tions. Interestingly, Jackendoff ’s proposal is just the most promi-
nent representative of a general trend within syntactic theory, of
which even Chomskyan minimalism is an example: that is, the
trend toward the substitution of representations for procedural
rules. In other words, the weight of explanation for language
processing is nowadays mostly placed upon the organization of
(linguistic) memory, not upon specialized processes.
On this background, Jackendoff describes the syntactic
arrangement of a sentence as the result of a double movement: on
the one hand, an initial word sets up “grammatical expectations”
about the possible sentence structures, based on the syntactic
patterns associated to that word at higher levels of the hierarchy;
then, “further words in the sentence may be attached on the basis
of the [previously activated] top-down structure” (Jackendoff,
2007a, p. 8). This amounts to the dynamic of bottom-up activation
of schemata and top-down activation of their other components
that is by now familiar to us. It is not a surprise, then, that
Jackendoff characterizes the process as non-directional, such that
it may work “from the bottom up or from top down or from
anywhere in the middle” (idem: 8), and as based on competition
between (and mutual inhibition of) alternative hypotheses, as in
our previous description of pragmatic processing.
Hierarchies in Action
Jackendoff ’s theory of parallel architecture shows very convinc-
ingly how, as far as language is concerned, hierarchical organi-
zation of representations is apt to explain generative processing.
But hierarchical representations have been taken to explain the
generative nature of action as well.
The similarity between language and action with regard to their
common generative nature is explicitly addressed in Jackendoff
(2007b) and is largely recognized in psychological and neurosci-
entific theories of action (see Mazzone, 2014b, for a review). For
one example, Baars and Gage (2010) observe that making plans
for the future requires the ability to reconfigure elements of prior
experiences in a way that does not exactly copy past experiences.
This ability, they claim, is apparent in tool-making, one of the
fundamental features of primate cognition, but “the generative
power of language to create new ideas depends on this ability as
well” (Baars and Gage, 2010, p. 402). According to the authors,
“the ability to manipulate and recombine internal representations
depends critically on the PFC [prefrontal cortex], which probably
made it critical for the development of language” (idem: 402). We
will turn below to this suggestion about PFC.
There is much research, in particular, on the relationship
between hierarchical representations and generative processing
in action understanding. Baldwin and Baird (2001, p. 171), for
instance, claim that a “generative knowledge system underlies
our skill at discerning intentions, enabling us to comprehend
intentions even when action is novel and unfolds in complex
ways over time” and suggest that this system “is probably just as
rich and complex as the generative system underlying language”
(idem: 171). They cite evidence that children can parse continuous
actions along intention boundaries. However, they claim, the abil-
ity to parse and process hierarchically organized actions applies
more generally:
Adults also appear to process continuous action streams in
terms of hierarchical relations that link smaller-level inten-
tions (e.g., in a kitchen cleaning-up scenario: intending to
grasp a dish, turn on the water, pass the dish under the
water) with intentions at higher levels (intending to wash
a dish or clean a kitchen; Baldwin and Baird, 2001, p. 172).
The idea of a strict analogy (together with common neurologi-
cal bases) between hierarchical structures in language and action
is further developed by Pastra and Aloimonos (2012), which offer
some detailed examples of how actions can be analyzed in terms of
parse trees, within the framework of “a biologically inspired gen-
erative grammar of action, which employs the structure-building
operations and principles of Chomsky’s Minimalist Program as a
reference model” (Pastra and Aloimonos, 2012, p. 103).
Moreover, Glenberg andGallese (2012) showhow amechanism
that is firmly grounded in the study of motor control might
have “been exploited for language learning, comprehension and
production” (idem: 905). Their proposal is based on HMOSAIC
(Haruno et al., 2003), which is a hierarchical version of MOSAIC,
amodel-based theory ofmotor control developed byWolpert et al.
(2003). Haruno et al. (2003) have demonstrated that, within such
a hierarchical architecture, higher-level layers “can learn to select
the basic motor acts and learn the appropriate temporal orderings
of those acts” (Glenberg and Gallese, 2012, p. 910). The whole
mechanism is explicitly described as associative, but the hierar-
chical structure allows nonetheless for abstract representations,
standing as a whole for intentions of the agent: in practice, while
at the lowest level in the model motor acts are simply chained
with each other so that any of them triggers the next one, higher-
level representations provide abstract patterns that capture action
structure and timing more explicitly.
Let me summarize. In all of these approaches to action, flexible
and generative processing is explained by means of hierarchi-
cal representations, in which patterns at higher levels prescribe
predictable arrangements at lower levels. As it should be clear,
those accounts place the explanatory weight on the organization
of memory, not on specialized processes; in some case, simple
associative processing is explicitly mentioned as the appropriate
mechanism formemory acquisition and exploitation. This picture
is entirely compatible with the above considerations on concepts
and language processing, and with our previous account of prag-
matic understanding. On the other hand, as we saw, consideration
of action brings into focus notions such as goal and intention. It is
therefore opportune to analyze in some detail how these notions
are related to our key notion of schema.
Schemata and Goals
It is reasonable to think that goals and intentions are complex enti-
ties, whose representation involves a number of components of
different nature.10 However, for our purposes we can confine our
10Mazzone (2011b) proposes that goals can be analysed in terms of (a)motoric
and perceptual representations of end-states; (b) attributions of value to those
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attention to a simplified notion of goal/intention, along the lines of
the above considerations on action. The idea—implicit in Baldwin
andBaird (2001), Pastra andAloimonos (2012), andGlenberg and
Gallese (2012)—is that the goal underlying an action is the end-
point of that action, with more complex actions being constituted
by a sequence of smaller actions each of which is a means to (and
a sub-goal of) the overarching goal, while actions at the bottom of
the hierarchy are constituted by simple motor acts.
There are two points to this idea. The first concerns the exis-
tence of goal-directed patterns in memory, the second the thesis
of a hierarchical structure of goals in the cortex.
As to the first point, Glenberg and Gallese (2012) argue, as we
saw, that higher layers in HMOSAIC contain abstract patterns
capturing the structure of actions. Based on our previous defini-
tion of schemata as the higher-level representations responsible
for the organization of items at lower levels, such patterns can be
legitimately considered as schemata. In the psychological, com-
putational and neuroscientific literature on action, the existence
of goal-directed patterns of this sort is commonplace. The most
explicit defense of this claim—actually expressed in terms of
the existence of “hierarchical schemas and goals in the control
of sequential behavior”11—is provided by Cooper and Shallice
(2006), mostly on the basis of computational considerations.12
They adopt the notion of schema proposed by Bartlett (1932) and
further developed byRumelhart andOrtony (1977) among others,
according to which a schema is a self-containedmemory structure
with a variable number of component parts. In their words, as far
as action control is concerned,
a schema may be seen as a means of achieving a goal
or subgoal. More generally, recent computational accounts
[: : :] take schemas to be goal-directed structures, with goals
serving to mediate schema–subschema relationships. Thus,
schemas achieve goals and, apart from at the lowest level
of the schema hierarchy, consist of partially ordered sets
of subgoals (which may themselves be achieved by other
schemas; Cooper and Shallice, 2006, p. 888).
Consistently, the authors describe the role that schemata play
in action control in terms of the bottom-up/top-down dynamic
we considered above: “Schemas are explicit and play a causal role
representations by the reward system; (c) representation of means to those
ends together with appropriate contexts (including an appreciation of the fact
that, for a given end-state, different means are needed in different contexts).
Moreover, intentions are usually thought of as consciously attended goals.
11This is in fact the title of the paper.
12The defence of goal-directed schemata in Cooper and Shallice (2006) is part
of a larger debate, markedly with Botvinick and Plaut, about symbolic and
connectionist models of action representation. Interestingly, in their reply to
Cooper and Shallice (2006); Botvinick and Plaut (2006) admit that schemata
and goals need to be represented somehow, they only object that “it is too
strong to say [that their own model] is eliminativist with respect to task and
subtask representations (i.e., schemas), it is true that the relevant patterns of
activation may be more difficult to isolate within [their model than in the one
proposed by Cooper and Shallice]” (Botvinick and Plaut, 2006, p. 921). More-
over, they argue for a “quasi-hierarchical structure” of action representation
(idem: 922), that is, a structure in which there is a balance between hierarchy
and context sensitivity—I will say in a moment something more on context
sensitivity in hierarchical representations. In sum, none of the claimswe report
here fromCooper and Shallice (2006) is really disputed by Botvinick and Plaut
(2006).
in determining behavior: Excitation and subsequent selection of
a schema cause excitation and then selection of subschemas or
actions” (idem: 892).
The hierarchical organization of schema and goal representa-
tions is claimed to account for flexibility of sequential behavior
(idem: 887)—an issue to which I will return in a moment. How-
ever, contextual flexibility is also explained byCooper and Shallice
by appealing to optional elements in schema representations.
This would allow schemata to be highly context-sensitive, since
optional subgoals can either be activated or not on any particular
occasion as a function of the context in which the schema is
performed (idem: 897). In order for this to be possible, schemata
should also contain representations of the contextual cues whose
excitation causes the activation of optional subgoals. The repre-
sentation of contexts is explicitly mentioned by Badre (2013) as a
component of what, in the literature on reinforcement learning of
actions, is called a “policy,” that is, a rule that relates an action, a
desired outcome and a state inwhich the rule has to be applied. This
notion of context is clearly more specific than the one involved
in our previous suggestion that schemata provides hypotheses
about context. The point here is the specific requirement that
certain situational cues must be present in order for certain goals
to be pursued. Based on these considerations, we can describe
a goal-directed schema as constituted by a final goal, a number
of subgoals (or actions that are means to that goal), and some
specification of the conditions in which both the final goal and the
subgoals apply. In another, wider sense goal-directed schemata, as
schemata in general, are chunks inmemory providing appropriate
contexts for each of their components.
The other important point, in the view of action as driven by
hierarchies of goals, concerns the question whether such hier-
archies are actually present in the brain, an issue that is better
addressed on the background of a general understanding of brain
architecture.13
The Architecture of the Brain and the Prefrontal
Cortex
As recently recalled byBadre (2013), Fuster (2001, 2003, 2014)was
the first to associate a concept of abstraction in action control with
the functional organization of frontal cortex. There is today some
evidence that the hierarchical structure of goal-directed motor
actions correlates with specific neurological regions (Hamilton
13One of the referees has correctly pointed out that there is neuroscientific
literature on pragmatic processing and the interplay between pragmatics and
intention recognition—involving different areas than the PFC—which is not
accounted for in this paper (see, for instance, Catani and Bambini, 2014;
Hagoort and Levinson, 2014). However, I want to emphasize that the purpose
of the next section is not to address the neuroscience of pragmatics; it is instead
to show that also neuroscience has proposed a hierarchical organization of
representations, in line with cognitive theories of concepts, language, and
action. This is further support to my general view of context construction
as based on a bottom-up/top-down dynamic of activation in hierarchical
representations. Thus, what I am interested in is theorizing (together with
the supporting evidence) about hierarchical representations in the brain. The
PFC is especially well studied in this regard, in particular in connection with
the issue of goal representation, and this is why I focus my attention on
it. This said, the issue of how the PFC and other cortical areas contribute
to the representation of intentions and goals undoubtedly requires further
investigation.
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and Grafton, 2006; Koechlin and Jubault, 2006; Grafton and
Hamilton, 2007; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 2008,
2013; Botvinick, 2008; Botvinick et al., 2009; O’Reilly, 2010).
This suggests, in Botvinick’s (2008, p. 205) words, that “a topo-
graphical organization might exist within the frontal cortex and
the DLPFC [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex], according to which
progressively higher levels of behavioral structure are represented
as onemoves rostrally.” For one example of these studies, Koechlin
and Jubault (2006, p. 936) reports evidence from magnetic res-
onance imaging showing “phasic activation at the boundaries of
action segments that constitutes a hierarchical action plan”; on
this basis, they propose that Broca’s area and its homolog in the
right hemisphere might “implement a specialized executive sys-
tem governing action selection in hierarchically structured action
plans.”
Although the focus of those studies is on hierarchical repre-
sentations of action in the frontal/prefrontal cortex, it should be
noticed that on Fuster’s account hierarchical organization is a
general phenomenon concerning the entire brain:
The physiology of the cerebral cortex is organized in hier-
archical manner. At the bottom of the cortical organiza-
tion, sensory and motor areas support specific sensory
and motor functions. Progressively higher areas—of later
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development—support func-
tions that are progressively more integrative. The prefrontal
cortex constitutes the highest level of the cortical hierarchy
dedicated to the representation and execution of actions
(Fuster, 2001, p. 319).
In other words, Fuster proposes that the brain is organized
along two distinct—though highly interconnected—pathways,
respectively constituting a sensory and amotor hierarchy of corti-
cal maps, which together form a perception-action cycle. The PFC
lies at the top of the motor hierarchy and it seems to contain neu-
ronal networks that, both in monkeys and in humans, represent
abstract programs or plans of action (Fuster, 2003, p. 76).
Two considerations are worth noting.
First, the above literature on action control emphasizes the role
that hierarchies may play in flexibly dealing with large spaces of
options. As Badre (2013) specifically notes, hierarchies permit a
divide-and-conquer approach such that, on the one hand, choices
about which actions to take can be made at multiple levels of
abstraction, while, on the other hand, choices at the higher levels
constrain the space of possible actions at lower levels. Compare
this with a situation in which an inflexible routine has to be
performed, and a single set of criteria for its application has to
be coded and then assessed against the factual context. On the
contrary, on the hierarchical account each component at lower
levels has its own set of application criteria, and the selection of
goals at the higher levels is the result of parallel activation of (and
competition between) components at lower levels, with substan-
tial gain in contextual flexibility. But this applies not only to goal
selection in the frontal cortex: if Fuster—and our whole picture
of the functioning of concepts, language and motor control—is
right, the mechanism of bottom-up/top-down activations along
hierarchical representations extends to the entire cortex, thus
accounting for contextual flexibility in a wide range of cognitive
processes.
Second, since we described the prefrontal cortex as the seat of
hierarchical representations, one might wonder whether this is
compatible with the well-established view according to which this
area has a crucial role to play in executive processes. As a matter
of fact, a “representational” versus “processing” approach to PFC
has gained consensus in the last decade (Huey et al., 2006; Miller
et al., 2002; Wood and Grafman, 2003), in line with the influen-
tial model of executive functions proposed by Miller and Cohen
(2001). As they observe, “one of the most fundamental aspects
of cognitive control and goal-directed behavior [is] the ability to
select a weaker, task-relevant response (or source of information)
in the face of competition from an otherwise stronger, but task-
irrelevant one” (Miller and Cohen, 2001, p. 170). Now, Miller
and Cohen’s suggestion is that the PFC contains patterns of activ-
ity which map onto configurations of representations in more
posterior cortical areas. When such a pattern within the PFC is
activated, this increases the activation of the posterior configura-
tion it is connected to and allows that configuration to overcome
task-irrelevant competing ones. In other words, plans of action in
the PFC are here conceived as schemata, whose activation is trans-
mitted to their components distributed in different cortical areas.
This does not necessarily mean that the spreading of activation
up and down the hierarchy is all there is to executive functions.
An influential proposal made by Dehaene et al. (2006) is that self-
sustaining loops play a crucial role in the neural dynamic, to the
extent that they prevent the rapid decaying of spreading activation;
more specifically, Dehaene et al. (2006) claim that conscious-
ness depends on the establishing of such loops between strongly
activated sensory-motor representations and higher association
cortices. This might explain how prefrontal activation ensures
stability of processing in accordance with current goals and tasks
of the agent: thanks to recurrent loops, plans of action within
the PFC might sustain the activation of related sensory-motor
representations for the time needed to attain the goals. Under this
account, there is no inconsistency between the suggestion that the
PFC is the top of the hierarchy of representations in the cortex and
the widespread opinion that it is key to conscious processing.
Executive functions are a third sense in which processes are
usually said to be top-down. First, low-level processing can be
constrained by higher-level schemata of various kinds; second,
it can be specifically driven by plans of action, that is, by goal-
directed schemata lying at the top of the perception-action cycle;
third, it can be under the control of action plans in circumstances
in which those plans and sensory-motor representations form
self-sustaining loops. I claimed above that pragmatic processing
is affected by top-down processing in the first two senses: in
utterance interpretation, hypotheses about the cognitive context
are constructed by exploiting the schematic organization of mem-
ory and, specifically, by activating goals within which the current
communicative intention is embedded. I would like to suggest,
though only in passing, that top-down processing in the third
sense might have a role to play in utterance understanding as
well. For instance, since in the normal case the speaker is con-
sciously attended by the addressee, speaker-related information is
likely to receive prominent activation in the course of utterance
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understanding (with consequences that are analyzed at some
length in Mazzone, 2013).
Conclusion
The main thesis defended in this paper is that, in understanding
an utterance, the organization ofmemory is what essentially drives
the construction of the appropriate cognitive context.More specif-
ically, in the present account contextual assumptions and conclu-
sions are provided by schemata, which are activated associatively
by a variety of inputs (the utterance, its linguistic and situational
context) and then assessed against each other. Goals have a crucial
role to play in this process, insofar as goal-directed schemata are
the highest levels in our cortical hierarchy of representations.
I showed that this picture is consistent with suggestions made by
RT and by Recanati, and with influential accounts of concepts,
language, and action control. I also provided reasons to think
that this hierarchical organization of memory and the related
mechanism of bottom-up/top-down activation can account for
generative processing and contextual flexibility.
The relation between the present account and RT invites some
final comments. As I said above, despite the suggestions developed
here, in its most general formulations RT takes a different view,
based on expectations about the amount of cognitive effects and
assessment of their actual amount against those expectations (in
what follows, I will call this the “standard view”). In particular, let
us focus on the fact that goal understanding plays no explicit role
in this view. It is interesting to consider what Sperber and Wilson
(1987) have to say on this issue:
Some commentators [: : :] think our definition of relevance
fails to do justice to pretheoretical intuitions. Utterances
are relevant, they feel, to purposes, goals, topics, questions,
interests, or matters in hand.
We define relevance in a context and to an individual. We
say what a context is, how it is constructed and how, once
constructed, it affects cognition and comprehension. One
reason we did not set out to define relevance to a purpose,
goal, and so on, is that we had no idea how to answer the
analogous questions for any of these terms [: : :]. Given a
definition of relevance in a context, and amethod of context
construction, however, there is no reason that assumptions
about the goals and purposes of the individual, or of the
participants in a conversation, should not form part of
the context and give rise to contextual effects in the usual
way. Such assumptions are likely to be particularly rich in
contextual effects, since purposes and goals imply plans for
action. We see no incompatibility between our work and a
belief in the importance of goals, purposes, and plans; on
the contrary, RT sheds light on how these important notions
may play the roles they play (Sperber and Wilson, 1987,
p. 742).
The suggestion is that explaining comprehension directly in
terms of goals is at least a difficult (and perhaps an impossible)
enterprise. Most of all, according to the authors such explanation
is not needed anyway, since RT can account for the importance
of goals in comprehension without any explicit mention of them.
However, the standard view might succeed in this ambition only
by providing a satisfying account of how the amount of cognitive
effects is assessed, while in fact we are left with no better expla-
nation of this than the speculation about “symptomatic physico-
chemical changes.” On the other hand, we provided here at least
the general sketch of an explanation of comprehension based on
schemata and goals, which is in fact consistent with the following
ideas of RT: the interpretation process requires the construction
of an appropriate cognitive context; this depends on the organi-
zation of memory, which determines the ease of access of con-
textual assumptions and conclusions; a mutual adjustment occurs
between explicit meaning, contextual assumptions and contextual
conclusions; specifically, backward inferences are based on expec-
tations about the type of intended cognitive effects. The account of
comprehension developed in this paper along those lines appears
better grounded than the standard view, if only for the following
two reasons.
First, it makes an appeal not to controversial claims about
sensitivity to cognitive costs and effects, but instead to well-
established cognitive facts (mechanisms of associative access and
the organization of memory in chunks), which can be argued
to play a key role in theories of concepts, language, and action
control, and specifically in the explanation of contextual flexibility
in those domains.
Second, this account embeds utterance understanding within a
general ability to understand goals, in line with Grice’s view and
in accordance with explicit claims made by Sperber and Wilson.
Interestingly, Sperber and Wilson’s notion of relevance is, in a
sense, a reinterpretation of Grice’s maxim of quantity. There is,
though, a clear difference between the two as to how they conceive
the purpose of communication: while the former assumes that the
speaker aims to be as informative as possible (compatibly with
considerations of effort), themaxim of quantity prescribes instead
that the speaker is “as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange)” (Grice, 1975, p. 45; emphasis mine).
In other words, in Grice’s account the amount of information
exchanged is not a purpose in itself; it is instead a means for
pursuing other goals. From this point of view, the notion of
relevance proposed by Sperber andWilson seems to fall back into
a pre-pragmatic view in which communication is conceived as
instrumental not to the variety of human actions and goals, but
instead to the acquisition and transmission of knowledge per se.
On the contrary, in line with Fuster’s proposal of a perception-
action cycle, the view defended here is that communication in
particular, as well as cognition in general, is geared to goal man-
agement and action (instead of to maximization of information).
This makes communication, in Tomasello’s (2008, p. 49) words,
an exercise in “practical reasoning.”
It is, I maintain, RT’s notion of relevance that is in the end
responsible for the problems affecting the standard view. The
point is that it is very difficult (and perhaps impossible) to give
a sensible cognitive instantiation to the idea of maximization of
information. If we abandon this idea, even the above quotation
may make new sense. As Sperber and Wilson say, “there is no
reason that assumptions about the goals and purposes of the
individual [: : :] should not formpart of the context and give rise to
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contextual effects.” In fact, I maintain, goal representations are
part of our repertoire of schemata in memory and they can
contribute to determine context via backward inferences. But
this is because communication is essentially a goal-oriented
activity.
In sum, my claim is that the quantitative notion of relevance
and the related idea of a quantitative assessment of cognitive
benefits raise serious problems. In my view, the good news for
RT is that large parts of the theory stay unaffected by these
problems.
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